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Predicting the Lifetime of Dynamic 
Networks Experiencing Persistent 
Random Attacks
Boris Podobnik1,2,3,4, Tomislav Lipic2,5, Davor Horvatic6, Antonio Majdandzic2, 
Steven R. Bishop7 & H. Eugene Stanley2
Estimating the critical points at which complex systems abruptly flip from one state to another is 
one of the remaining challenges in network science. Due to lack of knowledge about the underlying 
stochastic processes controlling critical transitions, it is widely considered difficult to determine 
the location of critical points for real-world networks, and it is even more difficult to predict the 
time at which these potentially catastrophic failures occur. We analyse a class of decaying dynamic 
networks experiencing persistent failures in which the magnitude of the overall failure is quantified 
by the probability that a potentially permanent internal failure will occur. When the fraction of active 
neighbours is reduced to a critical threshold, cascading failures can trigger a total network failure. 
For this class of network we find that the time to network failure, which is equivalent to network 
lifetime, is inversely dependent upon the magnitude of the failure and logarithmically dependent 
on the threshold. We analyse how permanent failures affect network robustness using network 
lifetime as a measure. These findings provide new methodological insight into system dynamics and, 
in particular, of the dynamic processes of networks. We illustrate the network model by selected 
examples from biology, and social science.
Many real-world complex systems are largely robust to outside attacks and spontaneous fluctuations that 
cause either temporary or permanent localised breakdowns1–9. However, the majority of them ultimately 
collapse and thus have a finite lifetime. The collapse commonly occurs when the system reaches a critical 
point and the system abruptly shifts from one phase to another10–16. Examples of real-world complex 
systems that experience sudden collapse are numerous, e.g., the spread of disease in living organisms17, 
the spread of political dissent in a human society, or the spread of a product sales pattern in economics.
In recent years network science has been utilized to describe complex systems18–32, and many dynamic 
network models have been proposed33–40 to explain the complicated dynamics that occur in real-world 
networks. Thus far, most network research has separated the analysis of (a) empirical indicators of crit-
ical transitions11–16,41 from the analysis of (b) network robustness1,2,9,42–45. The studies in group (a) have 
focused on a phenomenon known as critical slowing down, where the correlations and variance of the 
fluctuations increase as the system approaches a critical point14,46. The research in (b) focuses on quanti-
fying vulnerability of different networks under different types of random failures and deliberate attacks.
Most of the existing studies measure the structural robustness of the network by employing the the-
oretical framework of statistical physics and percolation theory to analyse the impact of a node or link 
removal on the structural integrity of the network which is commonly assessed by evaluating the size 
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of the giant component. In this regard, network robustness is quantified by the percolation threshold, 
which is the fraction of the nodes (or links) needed to remove for the network to fall apart (i.e the giant 
component to vanish).
Recent studies try to estimate percolation thresholds in different types of real networks for the site 
and bond percolation models44,45. However, measuring structural network robustness by static percola-
tion thresholds assumes an underlying network with static nodes and links where the failure of a node 
(or link) is equivalent to a permanent loss of its functionalities. Since in many real-world scenarios the 
functionality of nodes and links vary over time, theoretical frameworks for quantitative analysis of global, 
self-healing and targeted recovery processes occurring in different complex networks were also recently 
proposed40,47,48.
Motivated by the fact that ultimately many real networks collapse and thus have a finite lifetime, here 
we incorporate both (a) and (b) within a common theoretical framework based on decaying dynamical 
networks. We focus on networks in which nodes flip between two intrinsic states and also have the 
ability to control the state of their neighbours. Examples of these networks range from cascading pro-
cesses in interdependent networks29,30, epidemic spreading in scale-free networks17, dynamic networks 
able to spontaneously recover40 to the glassy dynamics of kinetically constrained models49. Among these 
networks of particular interest is a broad class of complex systems characterized by both a gradually 
declining trend37 and a sudden collapse50.
We find that introducing permanent failure in the presence of a stochastic contiguous spreading pro-
cess produces networks that are continuously decaying only up to a specific, critical point—the network 
lifetime (tc)—when the network abruptly collapses. We find that this critical point is logarithmically 
dependent upon the threshold and inversely dependent on the size of the outside attack. In practise 
when comparing different empirical complex systems, the value of tc may serve as an indicator of system’s 
dynamical risk. Using 1/tc then the larger the parameter value tc, the smaller the dynamical risk.
Results
Thus far no single network model has been able to explain the process of finite-time decline with the 
possibility of spontaneous collapse, how ageing or continuous ongoing time-dependent attacks affect 
network robustness, how long a network can continue to function before it collapses, or how to predict 
the time of network collapse (tc) prior to its occurrence.
1. The function of a node ni is dependent upon its nearest neighbours. Generally speaking, a network 
is robust if its nodes are able to function even when a large fraction of its nearest neighbours have 
failed. Here this fraction is denoted by Th. If at time t the fraction of active neighbours of node ni is 
smaller than or equal to Th, then at time t + 1 node ni will become externally inactive with a proba-
bility r. We use a fractional threshold51,52, which is more appropriate than the absolute threshold40,53 
when networks have heterogeneous degrees.
2. Each node can internally fail, independently of other nodes, with a probability p quantifying the 
magnitude of the attack. This is related to the static network case when robustness is studied under 
simultaneous random or targeted attacks1,2,9,36,54,55.
3. Although we assume that a node can recover from an internal failure after a finite period of time (τ), 
internal failure always carries the potential risk of being permanent, an event we define by a proba-
bility 1 − q. Thus, when a network is influenced by ongoing time-dependent attacks, not every node 
will be able to recover. A node can be considered active only if it is both internally and externally 
active40. For a more complicated network this will include adding the introduction of link failures or 
the addition of new nodes (see Methods and Model extensions).
Reference40 shows that when the assumptions (i)–(iii) are applied, then when the network model has 
no permanent failures the local node recoveries (modelled by τ) and the stochastic contiguous spread-
ing (modelled by a probability r) lead to the spontaneous emergence of macroscopic “phase-flipping” 
phenomena, corresponding e.g. to flipping between “good” (up phase) and “bad” (down phase) years 
in economics51,52. It has also been shown that when the size of the network is increased, the average 
time spent in the down phase is greater than the average time spent in the up phase. This result has a 
serious consequence when applied to model world economy and globalization—the model predicts that 
recession time increases with an increase in the number of countries in the world economy. Reference51 
shows that when the (i)–(iii) network model has no permanent failures, there are substantial changes 
in the autocorrelation and variance of fluctuations—characteristic of critical slowing14—as the system 
approaches a critical point.
In seminal studies of the stability of large complex systems, Gardner and Ashby56 (numerically) and 
May57 (analytically) examined how such systems maintain stability up to some critical level of connected-
ness and then suddenly, as the level of connectedness increases, become unstable. In contrast, our focus 
is on the reverse process in which a continuous decrease in the number of functioning nodes and links 
between them over time decreases network complexity. We describe the level of network functionality 
in terms of the fraction of the total number of nodes that are continuing to function40 and the fraction 
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
3Scientific RepoRts | 5:14286 | DOi: 10.1038/srep14286
of active links, fl51. In this dynamical network framework, in contrast to static networks, the network 
functionality is not only limited to the size of giant component.
The dynamic approach used to quantify the robustness of a network under time-dependent attacks 
can also be used to address the ageing process of networks. In this case the probability p serves as an 
internal network property40. Over time not every internally-failed node can recover, e.g., at the cell level 
in biology there may be a defective apoptotic process58.
To determine how Th and q affect network functionality, we first generate three random Erdős 
Renyi (ER) networks and three scale-free networks (Barabasi-Albert BA model), each with initial 
N(t = 0) = 10,000 nodes and an average degree 〈 k〉 = 10. Then, each network is placed under persistent 
attack, quantified by p, where we allow nodes in the inactive phase to permanently fail with a probability 
1 − q. For varying values of q for each decaying network, Fig.  1 shows the fraction of active nodes fa, 
the fraction of active links fl, and the average degree, each as a function of time. In Fig. 1 Th is fixed but 
the values of q varied, and we see that the network decays continuously until at some specific time (tc) 
Figure 1. Comparison between BA (solid line) and ER (dashed line) decaying dynamic networks, when 
〈k〉 = 10. Under the same level of attack, quantified by equal p, the BA decaying network exhibits the  
higher level of robustness than the ER decaying network, where robustness is quantified by larger tc. For  
(a) the fractions of active nodes and (b) links and (c) the active average degree as a function of time, the 
BA decaying networks are more robust than the ER networks. By active average degree we mean the average 
degree calculated for nodes that are active both internally or externally. Here the robustness is defined in a 
dynamic way—the more robust a network is, the longer it lasts. For both networks we use p = 0.001, r = 0.8, 
Th = 0.5, and τ = 50.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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it abruptly and spontaneously collapses; a collapse brought on by a sudden large increase in the num-
ber of inactive links and nodes. This sudden collapse does not require any parameter other than q. As 
expected, the more rapid variation of the exponential decay, the sooner the network will collapse. When 
we compare the fractions of active nodes and links we see that, when the network collapse occurs, the 
fraction of active links decreases substantially more than the fraction of active nodes, where the fraction 
of active links is approximately 1 − r.
Our analysis addresses both how long a dynamic network will function before collapse, and how 
robust it will be under long-term continuous attack, i.e., the larger the network lifetime tc, the more 
robust the network. This study of robustness of dynamic networks under continuous attack is highly 
relevant to both researchers and practitioners. For example, it can be used in military science for deter-
mining how a military network can remain robust under persistent enemy attack, or a goal in finance 
is determining how a financial system can remain robust when a fraction of its banks fails over time. 
References1,2 reported that scale-free networks are more robust than ER networks to multiple random 
and simultaneous attacks.
We next compare the robustness of decaying BA and ER networks, and our definition of network 
robustness is dynamic, i.e., the more robust a network is, the longer it will last. Figure 1 compares the 
robustness of decaying BA and ER networks under continuous long-term attack, measured by p, as a 
function of time. We use the same parameters for both types of network. Using network lifetime to 
quantify dynamic network robustness, Fig. 1 shows that, even when nodes and links fail, BA networks are 
generally more robust than ER networks. A dynamic BA network is typically able to survive longer with 
higher values of tc than an ER network before it exhibits an abrupt drop in the fraction of its active nodes 
and links and its average degree. Figure 1(c) shows that, for the q values displayed, the average degree of 
a dynamic BA network lasts longer (i.e., tc is larger) than the average degree of a dynamic ER network.
Figure 2. Robustness of BA and ER decaying networks for different values of q, where tc serves as the 
measure of robustness. We show tc versus p for (a) q = 0.995, 0.99, 0.95. The BA decaying networks exhibit 
higher level of robustness than the ER decaying networks. We use r = 0.8 and 〈 k〉 = 6. (b) For BA and ER 
decaying dynamic networks when a node cannot recover (q = 0), for 〈 k〉 = 6 the larger time tc (the larger 
robustness) we obtain for BA decaying network than for ER decaying network. Here, the larger the time tc, 
the longer the network lifetime, and the more robust the network.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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To determine whether this difference in robustness is general or sample-dependent, we compare 
decaying BA and ER networks for different q values. For fixed Th and r, and varying values of q, Fig. 2(a) 
shows the relationship between tc, whose precise definition will be explained in Fig.  3, and p. The BA 
decaying networks generally exhibit a higher level of robustness than the ER decaying networks1. We find 
a similar dependence between tc and p for varying network degrees.
The dynamic approach taken here also allows the non-trivial possibility that, following an attack, nodes 
can remain permanently damaged, corresponding to the q = 0 case in which no recovery is allowed. This 
allows us to compare our results with studies in which robustness is analysed in static networks under 
either simultaneous random or targeted attack1,2,9,36,54,55. Note that when q = 0, the period τ becomes 
irrelevant. For a fixed Th = 0.5 and 〈 k〉 = 6, Fig.  2(b) shows how the time tc is affected by the level of 
outside attack, quantified by p. Again as in Fig. 2(a), the larger the level of outside attack, the smaller the 
network lifetime. Because no recovery is allowed for this case, the lifetime values in Fig. 2(b) are much 
smaller than those in Fig. 2(a). When q = 0, decaying BA networks exhibit a significantly higher level of 
robustness than decaying ER networks, and the times tc calculated for BA networks are consistently larger 
than those calculated for ER networks—the dependence between tc and p follows a hyperbolic function.
In a complex dynamic system, thresholds and critical points control the transition process between 
different states59. A phase transition occurs when a system reaches a system threshold. Using this per-
spective, the network decline and collapse numerically described above can also be treated analytically. 
Note that at time t − τ, attacks on a network that has N(t − τ) active and inactive living nodes will cause 
pN(t − τ) nodes to switch to the internally inactive phase. The change in the number of living, or active, 
nodes is proportional to the probability that a node that internally failed at t − τ will not recover, 1 − q, 
thus
τ τ( − ) = −( − ) ( − ) . ( )dN t q pN t dt1 1
The number of living nodes remaining is determined by an exponential decay N(t) = N(0)
exp(− (1 − q)pt) with a decay rate of λ = (1 − q)p, where N(t)/N(0) is the average fraction of living nodes 
Figure 3. Indicators of network crash. Shown are two indicators together with the fraction of active nodes 
fa obtained for (a) BA and (b) ER decaying network when q = 0.99 and 〈 k〉 = 6. We show indicator I (mstd), 
moving standard deviation of fraction of active nodes (forward method) with window size τ = 50 (the same 
τ as in recovery process), and indicator II (crash indicator), the average fraction of active neighbours in 
excess of threshold Th. When the average fraction of active neighbouring nodes drops below the threshold 
Th for the first time (tc), cascading failures trigger a network crash. We use p = 0.003, Th = 0.5, and r = 0.8.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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equivalent to the average fraction of living neighbours of each node. For simplicity, let us assume that all 
nodes have the same initial degree k, remembering that node ni will be active if the number of its active 
neighbours is larger than m = Thk. For a network with degree distribution fk at time t, the fraction of 
′ni s failed neighbouring nodes Nf (t)/N(t) among N(t) living nodes previously estimated as 
k(t) = k exp(− (1 − q)pt), can be approximated using the probabilities of internal and external failures, p 
and E[m, k(t)],
∑′ ≡ ′ , , , ( ) = + ( − ) , ( ) , ( )⁎ ⁎ ⁎a a p r m k t p r p f E m k t[ ] 1 [ ] 2k k
where , ( ) = ∑



( )
( ) −



′ ( − ′)=
( )−E m k t
k t
k t j
a a[ ] 1j
m k t j j
0  and p
* = 1 − exp(− pτ)40. In the above figures we 
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≡
( )
( )
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( )
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N t
N t
N t
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1 exp[ 1 ]
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Here exp[− (1 − q)pt] is due to the continuous decline of the network, and 1 − a′ indicates the sudden 
network crash occurring when the fraction of living nodes k(t)/k approaches the threshold Th = m/k. 
At this limit, from Eqs. (2) and (3) we see that E[m, k(t)] → 1 and the probability of external failure 
dominates p.
Although predictive power is important in any scientific endeavour, it is widely assumed that predict-
ing critical transitions is extremely difficult because any change in the dynamic state of a system immedi-
ately prior to reaching the critical point will be slight11. Unlike early-warning indicators that utilize recent 
system outputs to detect impending system collapse, we use past data to estimate network parameters, 
from which we generate numerical simulations that describe the network state at any future time, includ-
ing the time of network failure tc. Thus we are able to accurately predict the time of network failure.
Figure  3 shows the predictive power of this dynamic approach when applied to both ER and BA 
networks which are in the process of decaying. It shows the fraction of active nodes for time scales that 
include the network crash and also two important values: (I) the standard deviation of the fraction of 
active nodes calculated using moving boxes similar to the approach proposed in Reference11 and (II) 
the average fraction of active neighbours—active both internally and externally—above the threshold 
Th. Equations (2) and (3) provide a theoretical explanation for II, predicting that when the fraction 
of currently living nodes approaches the threshold that controls the external failures, the probability 
of critical transition increases and cascading failures trigger a network crash. Note that just prior to a 
network crash, indicator I increases substantially and thus is an indicator of the impending failure and 
a predictor of the time tc, i.e., it predicts when network failure will occur. Reference11 suggests that as a 
dynamic system approaches a critical threshold its state at any given moment increasingly resembles its 
previous state, implying an increase in variance and autocorrelation as reported for dynamic networks in 
Reference51. We find that this predictive power holds for both BA and ER decaying networks for a wide 
variety of parameters. In Fig.  3 the values of II shift from positive to negative and the time when this 
occurs can also be used as a predictor of the time of network collapse tc. In addition to the two numer-
ical indicators, we also suggest an analytic formula for tc, obtained by equating (1 − a′ )exp[− (1 − q)pt] 
in Eq. (3) with Th, so that
= − ( /( − ′))/ ( − ). ( )t T a p qln 1 1 4c h
In the decaying network approach, the proportional threshold Th controls both node-level crashes 
and “macro” network-level crashes, which makes Th a breakdown threshold. For a general set of network 
parameters, the time of network failure is the ratio between the closeness of the fraction of active nodes 
to the threshold, −ln(Th), and the rapidity of their approach to the threshold, p(1 − q). In Fig. 3(a,b) we 
see that tc typically corresponds to the beginning of the network failure period. Additionally, for varying 
values of q in Fig. 4 we find that the fraction of active nodes decreases during a network failure in both 
decaying BA and ER networks for Th − r.
Figures 1 through 4 describe how tc is affected by Th, p, and q. Figure 3(a,b) show that during a net-
work crash the fraction of active neighbouring nodes approaches the threshold. We also find that the 
time series of the fraction of active neighbours of each node above the threshold Th substantially changes 
over time. Figure  5(a,b) display the average representing our indicator II, calculated for each network 
in Fig. 3(a,b), and also the higher moments, variance, skewness, and kurtosis. For different times prior, 
during, and after the network failure, Fig. 6 shows the distribution of the fraction of active neighbours of 
each node above the threshold Th. Just prior to network failure, skewness, kurtosis, and the distribution 
substantially change.
In estimating the time of a future network crash, we calculate network parameters from its creation 
at time t = 0 to some time t during which the fraction of active nodes fa decreases from 1 to some value 
f′ . When we numerically generate the network we thus record the time t at which fa reaches f′ . Then the 
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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true prediction of future network collapse is not tc but tc − t, i.e., tc represents the entire lifetime of the 
network, and our interest is in estimating the lifetime remaining after t.
Decay with the Stochastic Threshold. It is known in the field of finance that increasing the num-
ber of links between banks reduces the systemic risk and the risk of financial contagion60. Until now we 
assumed that the threshold Th quantifying network robustness was the same for each node. Such assump-
tion is not appropriate in the real-world of finance because not every bank is equally robust. We therefore 
assume that the robustness of each node is locally defined. For example, suppose two banks, X and Y, 
Figure 4. For the varying q values, for both decaying ER and decaying BA network we show the size of 
the decrease of fa during the network crash, equal to Th − r. 
Figure 5. Statistics of the fraction of active neighbours in excess of threshold Th for (a) decaying BA and 
(b) decaying ER network with 〈k〉 = 6. We show how the first four moments change over time just before, 
during, and just after the crash. Just before the network crash, skewness and kurtosis dramatically and 
abruptly increase.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
8Scientific RepoRts | 5:14286 | DOi: 10.1038/srep14286
have an equal debt of 10B$ but different assets of 15B$ and 12B$, respectively, and each allocates 3B$ 
to three neighbouring banks. If the criterion of bank solvency is that assets must be larger than debts, X 
can survive even when all neighbouring banks fail, but Y cannot survive if more than one neighbouring 
bank fails. Therefore X is more robust than Y.
We next assume that the robustness of each node is randomly chosen from a Gaussian distribution 
with a mean 0.5 and a varying standard deviation. Figure 7 shows standard deviations equal to (a) 0, (b) 
0.1 and (c) 0.2. In all three cases we find that the estimate for tc of Eq. (4), where now Th corresponds 
to the mean of the Gaussian, correctly predicts the time of network breakdown. However we find that 
the standard deviation of the fraction of active nodes rapidly changes as the uncertainty of the threshold 
increases. In the smaller Th uncertainty shown in Fig.  7(a,b), the standard deviation of the fraction of 
active nodes is characterized by one unique large bump. In contrast, when the standard deviation in Th 
changes from 0 to 0.2, we find that the unique bump disappears and is replaced by many smaller flash 
fluctuations, because different nodes in the network are characterized by different thresholds and thus 
do not collapse simultaneously. We conclude that heterogeneity in node robustness may create a more 
robust network, and allows us to devise a strategy for preventing a partially dissolving network from 
collapsing completely.
Note that Fig. 7 suggests that the average fraction of active neighbours in excess of threshold Th slowly 
decreases over time, with a functional dependence approximated by a linear dependence, I0 − αt, where 
each node i has its own threshold Thi. α represents a slope of the linear dependence that is comparable 
to p(1 − q) [see Eq. (3)], and I0 is intercept. Each node collapses when approximately I0 − αt = Thi. Then, 
for two nodes having thresholds Th1 and Th2, we obtain
α ( − ) = − . ( )t t T T 5h h2 1 1 2
The more robust the node, the longer it survives. The larger the uncertainty in Th, the larger the dif-
ference in the time of collapse. If Th1 = Th2 as in Fig. 7(a), we obtain a virtually simultaneous collapse of 
Figure 6. Distribution of the fraction of active neighbours in excess of threshold Th substantially 
changes during the network failure. 
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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all nodes. We may speculate that if t2 − t1 is larger than the average relaxation time during the cascade 
process when Th is homogeneous, there will be no unique large bump in the standard deviation of the 
fraction of active nodes, but two separate smaller bumps as in Fig. 7(c). In Fig. 7 we also find that when 
the standard deviation of Th increases, the relaxation time of the cascade process also increases.
When applying forecasting theories in practice, the effort of the modelling procedure must be to 
approximate the empirical system. Often we must also assume that the model parameters, commonly 
obtained by fitting past data, do not change during a period of forecasting. Thus, if the financial system 
of a country, modelled by a set of parameters, approaches a financial breakdown and the government 
intervenes, the model parameters must be changed. To this end, in Fig. 8 the average fraction of active 
neighbours in excess of threshold Th slowly decreases over time and just before the network collapse at 
t = tc the government intervenes by decreasing the threshold Th to all nodes causing an abrupt jump in 
the fraction of active nodes. As one may expect this government measure just postpones the network 
Figure 7. The effect of varying threshold Th on a network crash. Shown are the fraction of active nodes 
fa and indicator II (crash indicator), the average fraction of active neighbours in excess of threshold Th. We 
use the BA network with 〈 k〉 = 10 and p = 0.003, r = 0.8, q = 0.99, and the varying threshold Th taken from a 
Gaussian distribution G(μ = 0.5, σ) where (a) σ = 0, (b) σ = 0.1, and (c) σ = 0.2.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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collapse for some future time as seen in Fig. 8(a). Clearly this modelling procedure seems reasonable for 
countries where the policy of constant increase in indebtedness eventually must lead to a bankruptcy. 
Different government policies are shown in Fig. 8(b,c). In Fig. 8(b) the government, following “too big 
to fail policy”, intervenes at t = tc by decreasing the threshold Th for only 100 largest nodes. Similarly in 
Fig. 8(c) this time when the threshold is a stochastic variable taken from a Gaussian N(0.5, σ = 0.2) at 
t = tc the government decreases the threshold Th for only nodes with threshold larger than 0.5 (the less 
robust nodes).
Figure 8. By decreasing the threshold Th, and thus increasing the robustness just before the network 
collapse, the fraction of active nodes rises abruptly, and the network becomes more stable. Shown are 
the fraction of active nodes (black) and crash indicator (blue) for the BA network with 〈 k〉 = 10 where at 
tc the constant threshold Th is decreased by 0.2 (a) for each node and (b) only for the 1,000 nodes with the 
largest degree. (c) For the same network, but with a varying threshold taken from a Gaussian distribution 
G(μ = 0.5, σ = 0.2), the treatment of decreasing the threshold Th by 0.2 for nodes which Th is greater than 
0.5 is made at t = tc. We use p = 0.003 and r = 0.8. Light colours indicate the fraction of active nodes and 
crash indicator without the treatment.
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
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Characterizing tc dependence on real network structure. As the robustness of a network largely 
depends on the network’s structure, in addition to the analysis of ER and BA random network models, 
we also analyse dynamics of the decaying dynamic network model on a variety of real networks topolo-
gies. We consider a collection of 24 real-world networks of technical (man-made), biological and social 
systems with different structural properties (e.g. number of nodes, degree distributions, absorptivity, 
clustering coefficient and diameter) in order to show how they characterize dynamical robustness meas-
ure tc of the model.
For technical systems representatives we include physical infrastructure networks (US Power Grid61, 
Euro Road62, Open Flights63 and US Airports63), and computer networks64 that include networks of 
autonomous systems of the Internet from CAIDA and Route Views projects (AS-733, Oregon1, Oregon2) 
together with peer-to-peer file sharing network Gnutella. Protein-protein interaction maps for the 
human65, plant66, worm61 and yeast67 interactome network from CCSB Intercome Database are chosen 
as representatives for biological systems. Finally, social systems representatives include scientific collab-
oration networks68 (CondMat, HepTh, NetScience), interaction networks in online social networking 
platforms69 (ego-Facebook, ego-Twitter, ego-gPlus) and personal communication networks (PGP70 and 
email URV71), political blogosphere (Blogs72) and connections between board of directors in public com-
panies in Norway (Boards73).
In Supplementary Table S1 we provide the complete list of the analysed real networks with their struc-
tural properties. All networks were acquired from a variety of online freely available data sources speci-
fied also in the table. All originally weighted and/or directed networks were reduced to their unweighted 
and undirected projections without multiple links. Additionally, for networks with self-loops we analyse 
their structures with and without self-loops, while for disconnected networks, we also analyse their giant 
components resulting the analysis of overall 38 topological structures with different structural properties.
For all of these topological structures we report the averaged tc over 20 realizations of the model 
dynamics with p = 0.003, q = 0.99, r = 0.8 and Th = 0.5 in Supplementary Table S2. Supplementary Figure 
S3–S12. show a realization of the chosen model dynamics of the fraction of active nodes for which tc in 
the table was calculated. In order to easier compare tc results for the set of real networks with varying 
structural properties, in Supplementary Figure S1. For the same model we report, the tc dependence 
on the average degree of the two BA random networks with different size. Similarly, in Supplementary 
Figure S2, for BA random network with tunable clustering74 we report how tc depends on average clus-
tering coefficient and transitivity.
For three selected real networks (email personal communication network at URV, peer-to-peer file 
sharing network Gnutella and the human protein-protein interactome network) in Fig.  9 we show the 
dependence of tc on (a) Th and (b) q. The dependence is in agreement with the results of Eq. (4).
Discussion
In both the natural and social sciences a wide range of real-world complex networks have a finite life-
time characterized by abrupt shifts between phases. One of the differences between the behaviour of 
natural systems and social systems near a critical point is that the sudden random change commonly 
occurs at a fixed point in natural systems75. In contrast, in social sciences even a critical point is a 
random variable and, although there is an expectation that some radical change is imminently proba-
ble, it is generally assumed that it is not possible to predict the exact time of its occurrence. We have 
explored the predictive power for a particular class of dynamic non-equilibrium decaying networks. In 
Figure 9. The dependence of tc on (a) Th and (b) q for three selected real networks. We use model with 
fixed parameters p = 0.003 and r = 0.8, and in (a) q = 0.99 while in (b) Th = 0.5. The dependence is in 
agreement with the results of Eq. (4).
www.nature.com/scientificreports/
1 2Scientific RepoRts | 5:14286 | DOi: 10.1038/srep14286
our network model the proportional threshold Th responsible for node-level crashes is the parameter 
that also controls “macro” network-level crashes. Our dynamic network study includes cases in which 
nodes can recover (q ≠ 0) or remain in a failed state (q = 0) after a failure caused by the ageing process 
or by severe hostile time-dependent attacks. Model extensions are included in the Methods section. How 
successful our network model might be when applied in practice depends first on how capable we are 
in estimating model parameters, especially the critical threshold76 and second, how good our network 
is as a proxy for a real-world complex system. In practice the second issue is common when real-world 
stochastic systems, composed of large number of units, such as financial systems, are modelled using 
such theoretical stochastic processes as multivariate autoregression. In addition, real-world networks are 
not isolated, but interact with other networks29. Due to interdependencies between different networks, a 
shock to a particular network may change both its own parameters and the parameters of all the other 
networks in the system. Because the time to the network breakdown is strongly dependent upon network 
parameters, it is clear that any change in network parameters will also affect our prediction of the timing 
of network collapse.
Methods and Model Extensions
Adding new nodes. The model for network growth can be extended such that nodes can be created 
as well as destroyed. We assume that, at each time t, among N(t) living nodes, each living node can create 
a new node with a probability p′ . Figure  10 shows that the average fraction of active nodes suddenly 
drops when the average fraction of active neighbours in excess of threshold Th reaches zero.
The phase-flipping with decay. Reference40 reports that introducing both dynamic recovery and 
stochastic contiguous spreading leads to spontaneous collective network phase-flipping phenomena 
which critical behaviour of the system is characterized by first-order phase transition and hysteresis. For 
the q = 1 case, we set the network parameter to enable phase-flipping between two stable states. Figure 11 
shows that when the decay mechanism is included (q ≠ 1) with a decreasing parameter q, the fraction of 
living nodes gradually disappears over time and also the occurrence of phase-flipping phenomena and 
the collective network mode.
Introducing link failures. We assume that in decaying networks both links and nodes can fail at any 
time t. We also assume that any link  can independently (internally) fail with a probability 

p . We define 
a link to be “healthy” (active) if it is active both internally, controlled by 

p , and externally, controlled by 
p in (ii). Defining a dynamic network includes determining which part of the parameter space is char-
acteristic of a stable network regime and which is characteristic of an unstable network regime. Our 
dynamic network is defined by the three probability parameters, p, r, and 

p . We provide analytical 
results for the hysteresis behaviour in parameter space for the case when nodes always recover after an 
inactive period (q = 1), here enclosed by manifolds comprising spinodals that separate the regions of 
stability and instability. For an active node i with ki neighbours, the link between ni and another node nj 
thus fails either due to an internal link failure (X) with probability 

p  or an external node failure nj (Y) 
equal to a—in the latter case and according to definition, when nj fails, all of its links have failed. Thus, 
assuming X and Y are independent, the link is active with probability ( − ′)( − )

a p1 1  and accordingly 
Figure 10. Allowing that new nodes are added while the network decays, when the average fraction of 
active neighbours in excess of threshold Th reaches zero, the network abruptly drops. We use the BA 
network with 〈 k〉 = 10 and p = 0.003, r = 0.8, p′ = 0.00002, and the constant threshold Th = 0.5. Shown are 
the fraction of active nodes (black) and crash indicator (blue). Light colours indicate the fraction of active 
nodes and crash indicator without adding new nodes.
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inactive with probability − ( − ′)( − ) = ′ + − ′ ≡ ′
  

a p a p a p a1 1 1 . Similar to the case in (i), when 
the links fail internally we define node ni to be active only when there are more than m active links—not 
nodes, as in (i). Thus by
∑( , , ′) ≡ ′ ( − ′)


 −


 ( )=
−



E k m a a a kk j1 6j
m
k j j
0
we define the probability that the neighbourhood of node ni is critically damaged with more than m 
broken links. Finally, we derive the probability that a randomly chosen node ni with degree k is inactive, 
which is equal to the fraction of inactive nodes,
′ ≡ ′ = + ( − ) ( , , ′). ( )

⁎ ⁎a a p r p E k m a1 7k
Here we apply the probability formula P(X ∪ Y) = P(X) + P(Y) − P(X)P(Y) for two independent events. 
Note that this equation is derived under the assumption that internal failures affect external failures and 
thus the notion that external and internal failures are independent is only approximately true. Figure 12 
presents an ER decaying network and shows the predictive power for the case in which internal link 
failures are taken into consideration.
Equation (7) assumes that all nodes have the same degree, and thus for simplicity we here analyse 
random networks that are regular. Figure 13 shows the mean-field (MFT) prediction for the position of 
spinodals (merging at a critical point) in parameter space (p*, r) for fixed values of 

p  obtained from Eq. 
Figure 11. Phase-flipping with decay mechanism for the decaying BA network with parameters 
Th = 0.50, τ = 50, the average degree 〈k〉 = 3, 1000 nodes. With decreasing q, from 0.999995, 0.9999, and 
0.999 (from top to bottom) we show that the average fa decays with time where the smaller q, the faster the 
decay.
Figure 12. Indicators for network crash, similar as in Fig. 4 but now we include internal link failures. 
Shown are 3 indicators obtained for an ER decaying network when q = 0.99, Th = 0.99, r = 0.8, p = 0.003, and 
= .

p 0 003.
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(7), where p* = 1 − exp(− pτ) 40. In parameter space, the hysteresis region is enclosed by comprising 
spinodals.
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